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I INTRODUCTION
By the time of Australia's Federation in 1901, the colonies had established a
long tradition of discrimination against Indigenous peoples. As a colonial
country, racism was a founding value of Australian society - it justified the
wholesale denial of Indigenous peoples' rights to retain their social, economic
and political structures, while denying their rights to participate in the polity that
was under construction. This beginning helped to establish the fundamental
disrespect for Indigenous peoples that underpins Australia's legal and political
development. Disrespect occurs not just in the relationship between the state and
Indigenous peoples, but has engendered a more personal disrespect that is
experienced by Indigenous people on a daily basis. It is the ongoing tolerance of
disrespect that maintains racism as a core value of Australian society.
Achieving justice for Indigenous peoples therefore requires fundamental
change at every level. As Australia moves into its second century as an
independent state, an examination of the vestiges of Australia's colonial origins
should move us toward rectifying the fundamental injustices that continue to
undermine the foundations of Australian nationhood. Nation-building is an
ongoing process. It requires constant reinforcement of values and identity. It is
not sufficient to relegate the failure to respect Indigenous peoples as equals to
the vagaries of history, because that history constantly informs Australia's
identity, values and governance.
This paper looks back at those foundations but also at recent public policy
debates concerning Indigenous peoples' rights. We identify the shortcomings of
recent policies as stemming from the failure to approach Indigenous issues
within the context of the structural relationship between Indigenous peoples and
the colonial state. We suggest that Indigenous policy can no longer suffer the
absence of a process that has the capacity to tear at the institutionalised racism
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and discrimination of the Australian state and build respect for Indigenous
peoples as the first peoples of this land.
11 COLONIALISM AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF AUSTRALIAN
GOVERNANCE
Australia's founding ideology, one that is unique even among the community
of former British colonies, lies in the assumption of the inherent superiority of
the colonising culture, and their systems of government and civil society. History
paints Indigenous peoples in a savage light, often portrayed as having no concept
of civilised customs, societies or governments. This ideology has become
familiarly known, since Mabo v Queensland [No 2J ('Mabo'), as the myth of
terra nullius - the idea that the land was ,empty of law, government, property
rights and civilised society or culture.' This arrogance led Lt Cook to ignore his
instructions to seek 'the consent of the natives' before taking possession of
particular locations.2 It was this same arrogance that led the British courts to
declare, without representation from the Indigenous peoples of New South
Wales and without the benefit of any evidence, that the Australian continent was
'practically unoccupied, without settled inhabitants or settled law'.3
The 'settlement' of Australia was an extreme application of the notions of
European superiority that fuelled imperial expansion. The law of nations, the
international law of the era, while positing the equality of nations as a central
tenet, was also formulated to justify colonisation and limit recognition of
Indigenous peoples.- In 1539, Vitoria acknowledged that the Indigenous peoples
of the new world should be allowed to govern themselves 'in both public and
private matters'.5 However, like the domestic doctrine, recognition was
dependent upon a Eurocentric evaluation of the social and political development
(1992) 175 CLR 1. See. eg, the discussion by Brennan J at 58 referring to the 'enlarged notion of terra
nullius' .
2 Reproduced in Garth Nettheim. "The consent of the natives"; Mabo and Indigenous political rights'
(1993) 15 Sydney Law Review 223.
3 Cooper v Stuart (1889) 14 App Cas 286, 291-2. This case gave rise to the notion that issues of
sovereignty and the recognition of self-detennination claims were matters of law regardless of the facts.
The fundamental contradiction between law and fact created a dilemma for future courts in which
evidence was actually adduced. In 1971, a single judge of the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory
struggled with the incongruent facts and legal fiction: Milirrpum v Nabalco (1971) 17 FLR 141.
4 See. ego Samuel van Pufendorf (C H Oldfather (trans», De Jure Naturae et Gentium Ubri Octo (first
published 1688. 1964) vol 11; Christian Wolff (J H Drake (trons», Jus Gentium MethOOo Scientifica
Pertractatum (first published 1764, 1964) volll. xxxii. xxxix; Emmerich Vanel (C H Fenwick (trons»,
The Law of Nations or the Principles of Natural Law Applied to the Conduct of the Affairs of Nations
and Sovereigns (first published 1758. 1964) vol m. xii, xiii. See generally lames Tully, Strange
Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity (1995) 70-82. Cf Brian Slanery, Ancestral Lands,
Alien Laws: Judicial Perspectives on Aboriginal Title (1983) 26, where Slattery argues that the law of
nations is unreliable as a basis for claims because it was not settled and was determined largely by, or in
the interests of, the powers.
5 Fransiscus de Vitoria. 'Des Indes [1539]' in Anthony Pagden and leremy Lawrence (eds), Fransisco de
Vitoria: Political Writings (1991) 25t.
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of Indigenous peoples and was dismissive of the governmental structures that
were in place6
Treaties negotiated with Native American Nations and Canadian Aboriginal
peoples expressed the notion that these Indigenous groups constituted separate
and sovereign peoples who had their own laws and were capable, as nations and
tribes, of forming and breaking their own alliances with others, including
colonial powers, and who had national or tribal territories under their control.
The treaty process acknowledged that there is or was a distinct relationship
between the two groups that were defined in those agreements. These treaties
had the international character of agreement making - nation to nation.
Canada and the United States 'de-internationalised' these arrangements. The
COmmon law no longer regarded these treaties as having any of the
characteristics of international legally binding instruments.' In a recent report to
the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations, Special
Rapporteur Miguel Alfonso Martinez describes this jurisprudence as 'the process
of domesticating relations with Indigenous peoples'.8 In short, respect for the
equality of peoples was disregarded in the face of absolute power. While
Indigenous peoples continued to exercise sovereignty over their remaining lands
and peoples, the law no longer recognised their independence.
In Australia, the unique approach to settlement, which denied even the fact of
occupation by Indigenous peoples, led to even greater human rights abuses. The
colonisers did not merely reject the rights of Indigenous societies to govern
themselves, but also denigrated their rights within the new colonial societies.
The exploitation of labour, the denial of effective participation in social and
political life, the denial of protection under the law and the legalised or
condoned violence and genocide against Indigenous peoples were an integral
part of Australia's colonial identity. The ideology of racial superiority justified
the denial of individual rights of Indigenous peoples to manage their own affairs
as individuals and as groups. These are not innocent legal myths but are part of
the practical operation of colonial government that has operated to deny
Indigenous rights and self-government for over two centuries. Moreover, they
are based on ideals that are central to the philosophies of governance upon which
Australian institutions and systems of government are founded. 9
6 See, ego M F Lindley, The Acquisition and Govemment of Backward Territory in International Law
(1928) 11.
7 In the United States, this was rationalised in the 'Marshall Cases' as the recognition of 'domestic
dependent nations': Cherokee Nation v Georgia, 30 US (5 Pet) 1 (1831), 18. See, earlier. Johnson v
M·In/osh. 21 US (8 Wheal) 543 (1823) 547. 573-4.
8 . Miguel Alfonso Martinez, Study on Treaties, Agreements and other Constructive Arrangements between
States and Indigenous Populalions, Final Report, UN Doe ElCN.41Sub.1J1999120 (1999).
9 On the central place of this kind of elitism in the liberal theories of government, particularly in the
colonial administration of subject peoples, see Christine Helliwell and Barry Hindess, 'The "Empire of
Unifonnity" and Government of Subject Peoples' (2002) I The Journal of Cultural Research
(forthcoming).
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When the colonies came together to federate under a commonwealth structure,
Indigenous interests were neither directly nor indirectly represented in the
debates on the new Australian Constitution (,Constitution'). Despite a hundred
years of colonisation, even at the point of Federation, a great deal of the country
remained effectively under Indigenous government. Yet, these communities were
not included among the self-governing polities that came together to negotiate
the federal arrangement. This exclusion was reflected in a pervasive disrespect
that was explicit in the references to Indigenous peoples during the
Conventions. 10
It is not surprising that when the colonial governments negotiated the federal
settlement, they wanted to retain their discretion to exploit Indigenous peoples,
their wealth and resources, without interference from a federal government. The
still burgeoning economies were dependent upon continued expansion into
Indigenous territories. The treatment of Indigenous people as non-citizens,
divorced from any identity as self-governing polities with wealth or resources,
was reinforced in the text of the new Constitution. Indigenous peoples were
considered to be a resource to be managed as each colonial government saw fit,
their civilisation and welfare, too, were matters considered settled by the
principles of governance in place in each of the colonies.
As a result, s 51 (xxvi) of the Constitution, which provides that the
Commonwealth can legislate for 'the people of any race', specifically reserved
the power to legislate for Indigenous peoples to the States. Moreover, proposals
for an equal protection clause that may have guaranteed the equal application of
laws to all people regardless of gender, race, or ethnicity were rejected because
they may have impinged on the ability of the States to discriminate on the basis
of colour and race." Similarly, the right to vote at federal elections was framed
in a way that would accommodate the States that chose to deny the fundamental
right of political participation to Indigenous peoples and other people of colour. 12
Despite their deference to colonial governments in relation to managing their
Indigenous populations, even at the federal level, the principles of government
were made consistent. Certain classes of people, identified by their race or
colour, were subordinated and excluded and it was considered appropriate
government policy to 'regulate the affairs of people of coloured or inferior
races' .13
10 See generally Australia, Official Report afthe National Australasian Convention Debates. 1898 (1986).
11 Instead. a provision that proscribed discrimination on the basis of residence in a particular State or
Territory was included in s 177: see George Williams. 'Race and the Australian Constitution: From
Federation to Reconciliation' (2000) 38 Osgoode Hall Law Joumal645, 645-6.
12 Section 41 of the Australian Constitution provided that no-one entitled to vote at State elections would
be prevented from voting at federal elections. thereby protecting State legislation such as s 6 of the
Elections Act 1885 (Qld). This section is reinforced by s 25 of the Constitution. which specifically
recognises that where laws are in place to disqualify persons of a particular race from voting, those
people wiU not be counted for the purpose of detennining the population.
13 Melbourne. Australasian Federal Convention Debates. 27 January 1898. 228~9 (Edmund Barton).
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This principle has continued to play an important role in the interpretation of s
51(xxvi) in recent times. While overt references to Indigenous peoples in the
Constitution were successfully removed as a result of the 1967 referendum, it
appears from recent cases that the 1967 amendments did not overcome the
history of the framing of the Constitution. 14 The impetus for the amendments
was to remove the obvious discrimination on the face of the text and place
greater responsibility for Indigenous policy and rights protection with the federal
government. It was one of the most successful referendums in Australia's
constitutional history. The amendments, however, did not recognise Indigenous
peoples within the Constitution so much as make the text completely silent on
the place of Indigenous peoples in Australian legal and political structures. It has
merely ensured that the power to discriminate against Indigenous peoples has
been entrenched and centralised.
IV THE DEBATES OVER THE LAST 10 YEARS
In the 30 years since the referendum, and particularly in the last 10 years, the
issue of Indigenous rights has become one of the central issues in Australian
public policy and debate, particularly at the federal level. Australia's Indigenous
policy has become less overtly racist and paternalistic, as Indigenous peoples
have become more involved in the institutions of government, and there have
been significant attempts to improve the recognition and protection of rights.
The successful 1967 referendum. the national land rights campaign, the treaty
debates of the 1960s and 70s, reconciliation, native title, the Stolen Generations,
even the republic debate and debates over Australia's participation in United
Nations, have captured national attention with regard to the claims of Indigenous
peoples.
However, successive federal governments have been reticent to champion the
promotion, recognition and protection of Indigenous rights where it would
require a challenge to the racism at the core of Australia's societal values.
Instead, a tolerance for racism has been nurtured. Allowing those values to direct
policy development has resulted in the fragmentation of issues and the isolation
of the impacts of the colonial relationship. This year, while reflecting on the
centenary of Federation, Indigenous peoples have called for a renegotiation of
the relationship between Indigenous peoples and the state that diverges from the
policies of the past and reconverges to form a new approach. An examination of
the key debates on reconciliation and native title illustrates the need to approach
Indigenous policy at a more fundamental structural level.
14 See Kartinyeri v Commonwealth (1998) 195 CLR 337 ('Hindmarsh Island Bridge Case'). In that case, a
majority of the High Court suggested that the power to legislate for the people of any race did not
become a beneficial provision as a result of the 1967 amendment.
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In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the National Aboriginal Conference
('NAC') and the Aboriginal Treaty Committee became engaged in a campaign to
persuade the Australian government to negotiate a treaty with Indigenous
peoples. In 1979, the NAC put a concrete proposal for the negotiation of
outstanding issues of language protection, restoration of land, regulation of
development, compensation for loss of land and ways of life and control over
decision-making. The campaign was largely unsuccessful. It was felt that
Australian people were not ready for a formal document."
As part of an ongoing campaign, the Barunga Statement was delivered to
Prime Minister Hawke during the Bicentennial celebrations in 1988. It again
stated Indigenous demands for the recognition and protection of Indigenous
rights within the legal and political structures of the Australian state. Arguably,
this precipitated the development of a process to address Indigenous
disadvantage and produce reform in the lead up to the centenary of Federation.
In 1991, the Commonwealth Parliament enacted the Council for Aboriginal
Reconciliation Act 1991 (Cth), which provided for the establishment of the
Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation.
While one of the purposes of the Council was to consider a document or
documents of reconciliation, such as a treaty, the main focus of the Council's
work over its ten year life was to improve relations between Indigenous and non-
Indigenous people at the community level. l6 In particular, the Council sought to
raise awareness about Indigenous peoples' history and distinctive place within
Australian society. This emphasis was clearly aimed at addressing the individual
racism and discrimination experienced by Indigenous people, as well as the lack
of national acceptance of Indigenous culture and Indigenous peoples' view of
Australian history. It was thought that fundamental change would come from a
people's movement. The philosophy was based on an individual understanding
of the principles of equal participation and appreciation of cultural difference,
even embracing Indigenous culture and traditions as part of Australian identity.
However, it did not extend to political autonomy. Indeed, when the Chairperson
of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission, Mr Geoff Clark, at
Corroboree 2000, spoke of a treaty as a component of 'true' reconciliation which
goes beyond merely a show of public support, members of the Council were
concerned that support for the less confronting values of tolerance and cultural
diversity would not survive the introduction of this political element. l7
Toward the end of its time, the Council became more focused on the need to
publicly address the lack of recognition of Indigenous peoples' rights within the
broader community and encouraged public education and awareness. While
15 At the same time. the Aboriginal Treaty Comntittee.led by H C Coombs, had garnered pUblic support for
a treaty from a number of prominent citizens. The word 'treaty' has been a source of initation to
successive Federal Governments.
16 Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation Act 1991 (Oh) s 6(1).
17 Geoff Clark. (Address to Corroboree 2000. Sydney, 27 May 2000). Corroboree 2000 was the culmination
event in the work of the Council.
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maintaining its commitment to community-based initiatives in promoting respect
for Indigenous rights, the Council, in its Final Report, acknowledged that there
are some issues that must be dealt with between Indigenous peoples and the
state:
Reconciliation also requires a formal resolution of issues that were never addressed
when this land and its waters were settled as colonies without treaty or consent 'S
The Council put forward a concrete proposal for legislation that would initiate
negotiation directly between Indigenous peoples and the federal government.
They called on government to recognise the flaw in Australia's nation-building
and acknowledge the need for agreements or treaties and to negotiate a process
by which they can be achieved. '9
Former Prime Minister, Malcolm Fraser, in the 2000 Vincent Lingiari
Lecture, argued that it is the government that has the resources, authority and
power to achieve reconciliation:
[I]t is the government that must ... persuade all Australians that we must.act with
greater eXfedition and greater generosity. Government, if not this, another, will set
the pace2 .
The Council acknowledged that the failure to achieve significant reform in
housing, health, employment and other aspects of the lived experience of
discrimination of Indigenous peoples is linked to the lack of a formal negotiation
process. A formal negotiation process would allow Indigenous peoples to take
responsibility for their decisions as groups and as individuals from a position of
authority and respect. The work of the Council demonstrated that renegotiation
of the relationship between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians is a
governmental responsibility. These issues go to the heart of Australia's
constitutional make-up and cannot be resolved by a people's movement alone.
VI PRACTICAL RECONCILIATION
It is yet to be seen whether the final vision of the Council for Aboriginal
Reconciliation was able to take its followers with it. The population,
indoctrinated with the liberal values of equality through uniformity based on the
superiority of the institutions and culture of the colonial society, is resistant to
any challenge to those values. The conclusions of the Council can be directly
contrasted with the concept of 'practical reconciliation' that was propounded by
the federal government in response to the direction being taken by the Council.
'Practical reconciliation' is a new term within Australian public policy that seeks
to address Indigenous peoples' place in Australian society within a liberal
democratic model of unitary government and individual responsibility. Practical
reconciliation, at best, seeks to address Australia's failure to guarantee the rights
18 Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation. Reconciliation: Australia's Challenge. Final Report (2000) 103.
19 Ibid app 3 and recommendations 5. 6.
20 Malcolm Fraser, 'The Past We Need to Understand'(Fifth Vincent Lingiari Memorial Lecture, Northern
Territory University, Darwin, 24 August 2000).
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of Indigenous peoples to equal enjoyment of the privileges of citizenship in a
wealthy, industrial state. This includes taking action, including special remedial
action, to address issues such as housing, health and employment as isolated
problems - for example, by building houses and infrastructure, providing
structured employment programs and the like.
These policy objectives seek to address Indigenous disadvantage as an issue of
individual rights. This does not exclude issues of cultural appropriateness and
involvement of Indigenous peoples in some levels of decision-making with
regard to service delivery in order to achieve the full enjoyment of citizenship.
However, it does not admit Indigenous peoples' autonomy to address these
issues collectively, especially where that is expressed as a right to be self-
governing in regions or over jurisdictions for which they have the capacity and
desire to assert control. It certainly does not admit an underlying constitutional
issue.
As with any liberal legal concept, there is a danger of individualising the
concept of equality. Practical reconciliation does not envisage Indigenous
peoples' claims as the collective rights of peoples, which transcend the ending of
discrimination. The policy reflects a view of rights in which, for example, the
prohibition of discrimination and support for 'special measures' are seen as
embracing the idea of equality as a formal sameness of treatment.21 This
remedial rights framework is an extension of the 'civilising' of the Indigenous
population to enjoy the 'superior' way of life and enjoy equal participation in the
uniform structures of colonial government, where individual rights can be
accommodated.22 To confuse the concept of equality with sameness in this way
is to use equality and freedom from discrimination as a 'guise for assimilation' .23
This philosophy has underpinned the recent approach to Indigenous policy
generally, replacing the concept of self-determination that had been the stated
policy of Australian governments since the Whitlam Labor Government of the
21 The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened for
signature 21 December 1965.660 UNTS 195 (entered into force 4 January 1969) ('CERD'), signed and
ratified by Australia. reinforces the prohibition on discrimination and the obligation on states to
eliminate racial discrimination contained in all of the international human rights instruments: CERD
preambular para I, art 2 and expanded at art 5. In 1975, the Commonwealth Parliament passed the
Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth), which partially implements the Convention. The Act prohibits
discrimination, by any arm of government, on the basis of race, nationality or ethnic origin. The only
exception to this general rule is in the context of special measures, which may be introduced to overcome
disadvantage or institutional or structural discrimination.
22 Even the intemationallegal system has rejected this interpretation of equality and non-discrimination. In
1997, the United Nations Human Rights Committee reaffirmed the application of the provisions of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 19 December 1966,999
UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976) ('ICCPR'), to Indigenous peoples and asked states to
include reference to them in their periodic reports: Human Rights Committee, General Comment 23,
Article 27 (Fiftieth session, 1994), Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations
Adopt~d by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, UN Doe HRIIGEN/IlRev.1 at 38 (1994). See generally Sarah
Pritchard, 'Native Title in an International Perspective' in Research Institute for Humanities and Social
Sciences, University of Sydney, Sharing Country: Land Rights, Human Rights and Reconciliation after
Wik, Proceedings ofa Public Forum Held at University of Sydney, February 28, 1997 (1997) 35-6.
23 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, Nativ~ Titl~ Report, Jan-Jun 1994
(1995) 63.
834 UNSW lAw Journal Volume 24(3)
early 1970s. The self-determination policy in Australia sought to address
discrimination by ensuring that Indigenous peoples were directly involved in
decisions about legislative and policy changes and not merely consulted as
another minority interest group. However, this occurred predominantly within
existing or imposed structures, with the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
Commission most often held up as the pinnacle of Australia's policy of self-
determination.
Self-determination is understood in international legal theory as the right of a
people to participate in decisions that directly affect their rights and interests.
Self-determination is often understood as a process right that respects a people's
autonomy and authority in decision-making. Therefore, it also has the character
of a right of self-government, whereby the institutions that govern Indigenous
peoples, whatever they may be, are freely chosen by them. International bodies
have recognised that this may require 'positive measures' to allow Indigenous
peoples to exercise the responsibility for their own decisions.24 However, this
first requires an acknowledgment of Indigenous peoples' distinct constitutional
identity. This had been a conceptual difficulty for previous governments, despite
the rhetoric of self-determination, but is clearly rejected by the most recent
policy of practical reconciliation.
VII NATIVE TITLE
The recognition of native title has been a site of contest for competing views
of Indigenous rights and the recognition of Indigenous polities as self-governing
and autonomous. In June 1992, in the Mabo case, the High Court of Australia
('High Court') agreed that Indigenous peoples' title to land continued after the
colonisation of the continent and enjoyed the recognition and protection of the
common law.25 The Court dismissed the earlier doctrine of Cooper v Stuart,26
which denied the rights of Indigenous peoples based on a supposed scale of
social organisation, as unjust and discriminatory.27 The Mabo case affirmed that
distinctively Indigenous rights arise from 'prior sovereignty'.28
The form of title recognised by the High Court in the Mabo case is not merely
recognition of private or individual rights to land. Moreover, in Western
Australia v Commonwealth ('Narive Title Act Case'), the High Court rejected the
view that a law protecting Indigenous peoples' unique rights over land was
24 Human Rights Committee. above n 22, [6.2]. See also Pritchard, above n 22. 45. See also Michael
Dodson, Aboriginal and Torres SlTait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, Native Title Report, fun
1994-1u1 1995 (1995) 13. See the recent Human Rights Committee's Concluding Observations on
Canada regarding the implementation of art 1 of the lCCPR in relation to Aboriginal peoples: Human
Rights Committee, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Canada 07104199, UN
Doe CCPRlCfl91Add. 105 (1999).
25 (1992) 175 CLR 1.
26 (1889) 14 App Cas 286.
27 Mabo (1992) 175 CLR 1,40 (Brennan J); 182, 197 (Toobey J).
28 Ibid 60 (Brennan J).
200/ Renegotiating the Relationship between Indigenous Peoples and the State 835
merely a 'special measure' to overcome disadvantage.29 It was not
discriminatory, they argued, because the distinct identity and status of
Indigenous peoples were relevant in distinguishing the way in which Indigenous
peoples' relationship with land was recognised and protected.3o
Native title affirmed a communal title that arose from, and carried with it, the
power to determine the law and custom applicable to land. The native title
doctrine is therefore an acknowledgment of the continuation of Aboriginal law
and Indigenous society as a source of authority. The rights of Indigenous peoples
are recognised by virtue of their existence as distinct peoples and a distinct
constitutional entity, and not merely as a cultural minority within an otherwise
homogenous Australian polity." For these reasons, the Mabo case is seen as a
high watermark in the relationship between Indigenous peoples and the state.
However, at the same time that the courts recognised Indigenous peoples'
distinct constitutional identity, they asserted that the state has the power to divest
those rights unilateraIIy, without consent or recompense.'2 The majority of the
judges in Mabo held that such 'acts of state', though adverse to the rights of
Indigenous peoples, could not be legaIIy wrongful.33 The court relied on the
irresistibility of power as a source of sovereign authority.
Native title, they argued, can be extinguished by a valid exercise of
governmental power that demonstrates a clear and plain intention. 34 The basis for
this is the claim that the underlying title of the state may be perfected by the
exercise of complete dominion. Thus, the native title doctrine establishes a
hierarchical relationship between Indigenous interests and the interests of others
and re-introduces an element of dependency of Indigenous rights on the goodwiII
of the state.'5 The Court determined that native title did not enjoy the same
protection as other interests and was, therefore, a much more vulnerable title
than any non-Indigenous title.
The High Court, as a matter of policy and expediency, chose to subordinate
the rights of Indigenous peoples to other interests, even limiting the availability
of compensation for the damage caused by past acts and policies. They have
29 (1995) 183 CLR 373.
30 Ibid 4834. cr the judgment of Brennan J in Gerhardy v Brown (1985) 59 AUR 311, 339, where it was
argued that 'special measures may be necessary to achieve equality between groups'. See generally
Michael Dodson, 'Discrimination. Special Measures and the Right to Negotiate' (Paper presented at the
Humanities Research Centre/Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies
Conference. Is Racism Un·Australian?, Australian National University, Canberra, 21·22 February 1997)
10.
31 Patrick Macklem, 'Distributing Sovereignty: Indian Nations and Equality of Peoples' (1993) 4S Stanford
Law Review 1325. See also Menno Boldt and J Anthony Long, SUIViving as Indians (1988) x;v.
32 See Mabo (1992) 175 CLR 1,68·74 (Brennan J); 94, 100 (Deane and Gaudron 11) (but cf 92); 194·5
(Tochey J).
33 Ibid. cr Deane and Gaudroo 11 at 92 who initiallY commented on wrongful extinguishment, but reverted
to the power of the state at 94, 100. Justice Toohey at 194-5 was the only judge [0 affinn the rights of
Indigenous peoples against arbitrary ex;ercise of power by the state. The brief judgement of Mason Cl
and McHugh Jconfinned the ratio decidendi of the case in this regard.
34 Ibid 64 (Brennan J).
35 Patrick Macklem, 'First Nations Self-Government and the Borders of the Canadian Legal lmaginatioo'
(1991) 36 MeGill Law Joumal 397.
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placed native title so low in the hierarchy of rights and interests in land that
Indigenous peoples do not have the power to determine development on their
lands. Rather than aim to reflect, to the fullest extent, the rights of Indigenous
peoples to own, develop and control their land, the courts have relied on the of
the rights, as emerging from Indigenous society, as a source of vulnerability.36
The doctrine of extinguishment replaced terra nullius, with a basis for
dispossession no less reliant on a conception of Indigenous society as a relic of
'prior sovereignty'. While acknowledging Indigenous rights as unique, the
doctrine does not see Indigenous society as an equal source of rights and
obligations.
The Court constrained the arbitrary treatment of Indigenous rights by holding
that the introduction of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) ('RDA')
ensured that, at minimum, the same protection - such as the constitutional
guarantee of just terms for compulsory acquisition of property - that applies to
non-Indigenous interests must also apply to Indigenous titles.37 In the absence of
constitutional entrenchment of the principle of non-discrimination, however, the
paramountcy of the Australian legislature makes it possible for the
Commonwealth Parliament to pass laws that are inconsistent with the RDA. The
Commonwealth Parliament exercised this power in s 7 of the Native Title Act
1993 (Cth) ('Native Title Act') in order to validate non-Indigenous interests that
may have been affected by the recognition of native title.
The Native Title Amendment Act 1998 (Cth) further circumscribed native title
rights and interests and again validated non-Indigenous titles. The amendments
were based on the same philosophy underpinning practical reconciliation, to treat
all interests the same without differentiation. The federal government had
embraced the idea of 'balancing' rights and interests so that native title would
not unduly interfere with the interests of others.J8
The Mabo decision did not deliver a just settlement either through the
decision itself or through the Native Title Act and its amending Act. It did not
address the legitimate historical grievances of Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander peoples. Despite these significant limitations, the recognition of native
title has forced a fundamental change in attitude toward the right of Indigenous
peoples to assert their distinct political identity. In recognising collective rights
to traditional lands, the courts have provided a more secure base from which to
argue for a greater role in decision-making over those lands and greater respect
for Indigenous peoples' claims more generally.
36 See Lisa Strelein, 'Conceptualising Native Title' (2001) 23 Sydney Law Review 95, 120-2. See also
Commonwealth v Yarmirr; Yarm;rr v Northern Territory (2oot} HeA S6 (Unreported. Gleeson Cl,
Gaudron. McHugh, Gummow, Kirby. Hayne and Callinan Ht 11 October 2001) [271l (Kirby J).
37 Mabo (1992) 175 CLR 1. 15 (Mason CJ and McHugh J). The judgement of Mason CJ and McHugh J
was said to be made with the authority of the rest of the Court. Therefore the detemrination of the Racial
Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) and wrongful extinguishment issue in that judgement is taken to be the
position of the majority. See also Mabo v Queensland {No 1] (1998) 166 CLR 186.
38 Although whether the Native Title Amendment Act 1998 (Cth) complies with this formal equality
standard has also been questioned. See Parliamentary Joint Committee on Native Title and the
Aboriginal and Toms Strait Islander Land Fund, Undertakings Freely Given: Australia's International
Obligations to Protect Indigenous Rights. Report (2000) 145ff.
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VIII THE RE-CONVERGENCE OF INDIGENOUS POLICY: THE
TREATY DEBATE
Looking back over the last three decades of Indigenous rights in Australian
law, and looking towards the future for the recognition of Indigenous rights, the
divergence and reconvergence of debates relating to human rights, native title,
reconciliation and treaties is significant. A recent native title conference
reflecting on these themes demonstrated their reconvergence.39
After a decade of separation between native title and reconciliation and the
removal of treaty questions from the agenda, there is now an unavoidable
overlapping of these processes. One can no longer be considered without
touching or more likely embracing the others. The underlying fundamental
relationship between Indigenous peoples and the state and the assertion of self-
determination by Indigenous peoples lies at the heart of all of these engagements.
The concerns expressed by the NAC in 1979 have returned for reconsideration
in a new debate. Despite their failings, the reconciliation and native title
processes have set the groundwork for a reinvigorated treaty debate. The
reconciliation process remains directed primarily at changing non-Indigenous
views and relationships at an individual and community level. For Indigenous
peoples to continue to engage in such a process, a response is required at a
national government level that .respects Indigenous peoples' status within the
Australian society as constitutional entities, based on a policy of equality of
peoples. A framework is needed, within which Indigenous and non-Indigenous
peoples can renegotiate and restructure their relationship. Debates on native title
and reconciliation have provided a context for this discussion by setting a
benchmark against which recognition can be measured and by providing a new
language of Indigenous authority and an ongoing process of engagement.
But the limitations of these processes have constrained their capacity to deal
comprehensively with Indigenous peoples' claims. Ultimately, practical
reconciliation, reconciliation as envisaged by the Council and native title are not,
of themselves, the appropriate method for structuring the relationship between
Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples. Those debates have not moved beyond
the cultural imperialism of the Australian colonial mindset. While they embrace
Indigenous cultural identity, they maintain Indigenous political identity within a
scale of social organisation that legitimises the management of Indigenous
39 Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies, The Past and Future of Land Rights,
Native Title Legal Conference, Townsville, 28·30 August 2001 (convened by Greg McIntyre and Usa
Strelein). The conference commemorated the earlier lames Cook Students Union and Townsville Treaty
Committee Conference, Land Rights and the Future of Australian Race Relations. lames Cook
University, TownsvilIe, 1981 (see the publication from that conference: Eric Olbrei (ed), Black
Australians: The Prospects for Change (1982». It was at the 1981 conference that a group of Torres
Strait Islanders led by Eddie Koiki Mabo gave instructions to take their claim for recognition of their
rights to their traditional lands on Murray Island to the Australian courts.
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affairs from outside and denies Indigenous peoples' autonomy in decision-
making processes.
Colonialism and its racist ideology is not a relic of Australia's past, it is a part
of the fabric of the Australian identity, how we are governed and how we
respond to the claims of Indigenous peoples in contemporary debate. The claims
that Indigenous peoples make today cannot be divorced from their historical
context and the failure by the British in their invasion and occupation of
Australia to negotiate an agreement with the First Peoples. The concept of
'unfinished business' seeks to capture this idea that practical measures of
addressing Indigenous peoples' lived experience of discrimination cannot ignore
the fundamental renegotiation of the Australian state demanded by Indigenous
peoples. The failure to obtain the consent of Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander peoples, subsequently compounded by the dispossession and ill-
treatment of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples by the new
arrivals and their descendants, provides a moral component to these claims.
These grievances are not defined by meeting the physical needs of Indigenous
peoples. The moral legitimacy will never be met by better informed government
policies of service delivery and the provision of reasonable health, housing and
education - of so-called practical reconciliation. Intensive government programs
directed at bringing about equality with other citizens will not, of themselves,
provide justice for Indigenous peoples.
To address this question of legitimacy, there has to be a recognition and
acceptance by the state of two factors. First, that the Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander peoples have been injured throughout the colonisation process and just
recompense is owed. Second, that the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
peoples as First Peoples have distinctive rights and a special status based on
prior and continuing occupation of land, and authority and autonomy as distinct
polities.
Indigenous peoples in Australia must have a process for renegotiating a place
within the constitution of Australian society that accommodates their myriad
histories and aspirations for the future. This process must be driven by national
leadership and a national framework that sets benchmarks for the recognition of
rights and interests. Indigenous peoples deserve respect as the First Peoples of
this land and deserve to be reinvested with their heritage in ways that resonate
within Australia's 'national' identity. Renegotiating the relationship between
Indigenous peoples and the state will provide greater legitimacy to Australian
nationhood and the sense of shared identity that has been palpably absent in
Australia's first one hundred years.
The time is right to talk about a treaty during the centenary of Federation.
Even the word 'federate' is derived from a Latin word meaning to make a treaty.
The Constitution is essentially a treaty between the former colonies and the
Imperial Parliament of Britain. Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples
were excluded as relevant parties in the formation of the Australian federation. If
treaties, or indeed the Constitution, had been negotiated on the basis of
principles of respect for the equality of Indigenous societies, and provided a
place for Indigenous peoples within the federal system, the structure of
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Federation would, no doubt, have incorporated a different dynamic. A national
treaty process that invites Indigenous peoples to participate as partners in this
federation will reflect a nation that has matured, and a people who have matured
as a nation and who have rejected racism as their founding value.
